We lay out a tractable model for …scal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-speci…c shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal policy requires that in ‡ation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank. On the other hand, the relinquishment of an independent monetary policy, coupled with nominal price rigidities, generates a stabilization role for …scal policy, one beyond the e¢ cient provision of public goods. Interestingly, the stabilizing role for …scal policy is shown to be desirable not only from the viewpoint of each individual country, but also from that of the union as a whole
Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has led to an array of new challenges for policymakers. Those challenges have been re ‡ected most visibly in the controversies surrounding the implementation and proposed reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as in the frequent criticisms of the interest rate policy implemented by the European Central Bank. From the perspective of macroeconomic theory, the issues raised by EMU have created an urgent need for an analytical framework that would allow us to evaluate alternative monetary and …scal policy arrangements for EMU, or other monetary unions that may emerge in the future. In the present paper we propose a tractable framework suitable for the analysis of …scal and monetary policy in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies.
In our opinion that analytical framework has to meet several desiderata. First, it has to incorporate some of the main features characterizing the optimizing models with nominal rigidities that have been developed and used for monetary policy analysis in recent years. Secondly, it should contain a …scal policy sector, with a purposeful …scal authority. Thirdly, the framework should comprise many open economies, linked by trade and …nancial ‡ows.
The framework we propose aims at meeting the three desiderata listed above. First, we introduce nominal rigidities by assuming a staggered price setting structure, analogous to the one embedded in the workhorse model used for monetary policy analysis in closed economies, which we treat as a useful benchmark. Secondly, we incorporate a …scal policy sector, by allowing for country-speci…c levels of public consumption, and by having the latter yield utility to domestic households. Finally, we model the currency union as being made up of a continuum of small open economies, subject to imperfectly correlated productivity shocks. That modelling choice stands in contrast with most optimizing sticky price models of the world economy found in the literature, where tractability often requires that they be restricted to two-country world economies. 1 Yet, while such a framework may be useful to discuss issues pertaining to the links between two large economies (say, the U.S. and the euro area), it can hardly be viewed as a realistic description of the incentives and constraints facing policymakers in a monetary union like EMU, currently made up of thirteen countries (each with an independent …scal authority), but expected to accommodate as many as twelve additional members over the next few years. Clearly, and in contrast with models featuring two large economies, the majority of the countries in EMU are small relative to the union as a whole. As a result, their policy decisions, taken in isolation, are likely to have very little impact on other countries. By looking at the limiting case of a continuum of economies, with each economy of negligible size relative to the rest of the world, we overcome the tractability problems associated with "large N ".
Our analysis focuses on the optimal …scal and monetary policies from the viewpoint of the currency union as a whole. In particular we determine the monetary and …scal policy rules that maximize a second-order approximation to the integral of utilities of the representative households inhabiting the di¤erent countries in the union.
Two main results emerge from that analysis. First, we show that it is optimal for the (common) monetary authority to stabilize in ‡ation in the union as a whole. Attaining that goal generally requires o¤setting the threats to price stability that may arise from the joint impact of the …scal policies implemented at the country level. Our …nding would thus seem to provides a rationale for a monetary policy strategy like the one adopted by the European Central Bank, i.e. one that focuses on attaining price stability for the union as a whole. It is important to stress, however, that the optimality of that policy is conditional on the national …scal authorities simultaneously implementing their part of the optimal policy package. The latter implies a neutral …scal stance in the aggregate -in a sense to be made precise below-, which poses no in ‡ationary pressures on the union. We argue that, in the absence of such coordinated response by the national …scal authorities, the union's central bank may …nd it optimal to deviate from a strict in ‡ation targeting policy.
Second, under the optimal policy arrangement, each country's …scal authority plays a dual role, trading-o¤ between the provision of an e¢ cient level of public goods and the stabilization of domestic in ‡ation and output gap. Interestingly, we …nd that the existence of such a stabilizing role for …scal policy is desirable not only from the viewpoint of each individual country, but also from that of the union as a whole. Our simulations under the optimal policy mix of a representative economy's response to an idiosyncratic productivity shock show that the strength of the countercyclical …scal response increases with the importance of nominal rigidities. Such …nding may call into question the desirability of imposing external constraints on a currency union's members ability to conduct countercyclical …scal policies, when the latter seek to limit the size of the domestic output gap and in ‡ation di¤erentials resulting from idiosyncratic shocks.
Before we turn to a description of our model we make a brief reference to the related literature. Several recent papers have also used a microfounded DSGE framework to analyze the nature of optimal policy in a currency union.
2 Benigno (2004) develops a model of a two-country monetary union, where each country is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In contrast with the present paper, Benigno's analysis does not deal with …scal policy, focusing instead on the characterization of the optimal monetary policy by the common monetary authority. When countries di¤er only in size, he shows that the optimal policy requires that the price level for the union as a whole be fully stabilized, a result consistent with the one we obtain under coordinated policies.
Closer to the present paper, though written independently, Beetsma and Jensen (2005; BJ, henceforth) have also analyzed the role of …scal stabilization policy in the context of a monetary union. Although our optimal policy implications are similar to theirs, our paper di¤ers in several respects, both in terms of modelling choices and the type of exercises conducted. Perhaps most noticeably, our model features a continuum of small open economies, whereas BJ's framework is a more conventional two-country model. The ‡exibility of this setup allows, among other things, to assess the optimal policy problem for a small open economy considered in isolation (inside or outside the monetary union), since the negligible size of each country implies the absence of feedback e¤ects from the rest of economies. In general, we believe our setting, while clearly an abstraction, may be capturing better the environment facing a majority of current and future members of the euro area. Finally, Ferrero (2006) also analyzes optimal monetary and …scal policy setting in a two-country currency area. His contribution is complementary to ours, in that he includes a role for distortionary taxation and government debt. The presence of government debt implies that the government budget balance is an explicit constraint in the policy problem, leading to a modi…ed optimal targeting rule for the union as a whole, in which both current and past in ‡ation (as opposed to current in ‡ation only as in our case) are proportional to the rate of change in the output gap. At the level of each individual country, however, the optimal response to country-speci…c shocks still implies sizeable variability in the spending and tax gaps, even if policy in each country is set optimally from a union-wide perspective. 4 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium dynamics in a currency union, from the perspective of both a single member economy and of the union as a whole. In Section 4 we study the e¢ cient allocation under ‡exible prices. In Section 5 we highlight the policy tradeo¤s for both the Union as a whole and for each individual country. In Section 6 we analyze optimal monetary and …scal policy in a currency union under nominal rigidities. Section 7 concludes and suggests extensions for future work.
A Currency Union Model
We model the currency union as a closed system, made up of a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit interval. Each economy, indexed by i 2 [0; 1] is of measure zero; as a result, its domestic policy decisions do not have any impact on the rest of the union. While di¤erent economies are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks, we assume that they share identical preferences, technology, and market structure.
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Next we describe in detail the problem facing households and …rms in our model economy.
Households
Consider a typical country belonging to the monetary union (say, country i). We assume it is inhabited by an in…nitely-lived representative household seeking to max-4 In addtion, the presence of distortionary taxes prevents Ferrero from using lump-sum taxes to correct for the steady-state market power distortion. This requires employing the methodology of Benigno and Woodford (2006) to derive an approximated welfare objective for the union.
5 In Galí and Monacelli (2005) we used a similar modelling approach, though the focus of that paper-the design of monetary policy in a single, small open economy with its own central bank-is very di¤erent from the one in the present paper.
where C is an index of public consumption, described in a separate section below. More precisely, C i t is a composite consumption index de…ned by
where C i i;t is an index of country i's consumption of domestic goods (i.e., goods produced in country i itself) given by the CES function
where j 2 [0; 1] denotes the type of good (within the set produced in country i).
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Variable C i F;t is an index of country i's consumption of imported goods, given by:
where c i f;t log C i f;t is, in turn, the log of an index of the quantity of goods consumed by country i's households that are produced in (and, hence, imported from) country f . That index is de…ned in a way symmetric to (3), that is:
Notice that in the speci…cation of preferences described above 2 [0; 1] is the weight of imported goods in the utility of private consumption. Given that the weight of the home economy in the union is in…nitesimal, a value for strictly less than one re ‡ects the presence of home bias in private consumption, implying that households in di¤erent countries will have di¤erent consumption baskets.
7 Equivalently, we can think of as an index of openness.
Finally, notice that parameter > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within any given country, independently of the producing country.
Maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form:
(5) for t = 0; 1; 2; :::, where P f t (j) is the price of good j produced in country f (expressed in units of the single currency). D i t+1 is the nominal payo¤ in period t + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t (and which may include shares in …rms, local and foreign), W i t is the nominal wage, and T i t denotes lump-sum taxes. We assume that households have access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded across the union. Q t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo¤s, common across countries. Also, implicit in the notation in (5)-which features a single country index for each price-is the assumption that the law of one price holds across the union.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure on the goods produced in a given country yields the demand functions:
for all i; f; j 2 [0; 1].
represents country i's domestic price index (i.e., an index of prices of domestically produced goods), for all i 2 [0; 1].
Notice that, as a consequence of the law of one price, P f t
is the price index for the bundle of goods imported from country f , as well as the latter's domestic price index. It follows from (6) that
Furthermore, the optimal allocation of expenditures on imported goods by country of origin implies:
for all f 2 [0; 1], where P t exp R 1 0 p f t df is the union-wide price index. From the viewpoint of any individual country, P t is also a price index for imported goods. Notice that (7) implies that we can write total expenditures on imported goods as
Finally, and letting P i c;t (P i t ) 1 (P t ) denote the consumer price index (CPI) for country i, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods in that country is given by:
Combining all previous results, we can write total consumption expenditures by country i's households as P i t C i i;t + P t C i F;t = P i c;t C i t . Thus, and conditional on an optimal allocation of expenditures, the period budget constraint can be rewritten as:
In what follows we assume that the period utility takes the simple form
where parameter 2 [0; 1) measures the weight attached to public consumption (relative to private consumption).
The remaining optimality conditions for country i's households are thus given by:
which are assumed to hold for all periods and states of nature (at t and t + 1, in the case of (12)). Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (12) and rearranging terms we obtain a conventional Euler equation:
where
is the gross nominal return on a riskless one-period discount bond paying o¤ one unit of the common currency in t + 1 or, for short, the (gross) nominal interest rate. Below we assume that the union's central bank uses that interest rate as its main instrument of monetary policy.
For future reference it is useful to note that (11) and (13) can be respectively written in log-linearized form as:
where, as before, lower case letters denote the logs of the respective variables, log is the time discount rate, and 
Some De…nitions and Identities
Before proceeding with our analysis, we introduce several assumptions and de…nitions, and derive a number of identities that are extensively used below.
We start by de…ning the bilateral terms of trade between countries i and f as S i f;t P f t P i t , i.e., the price of country f 's domestically produced goods in terms of country i's. The e¤ective terms of trade for country i are thus given by Notice also that the CPI and the domestic price levels are related according to:
or, in logs:
Hence, it follows that domestic in ‡ation -de…ned as the rate of change in the price index for domestically produced goods, i.e., 
which makes the gap between our two measures of in ‡ation proportional to the percent change in the terms of trade, with the coe¢ cient of proportionality given by the index of openness .
Notice that the distinction between CPI in ‡ation and domestic in ‡ation, while meaningful at the level of each country, vanishes for the currency union as a whole. Formally, integrating (15) over i 2 [0; 1] and using the fact that R 1 0 s i t di = 0, yields the basic equality: p c;t = p t and, hence, c;t = t .
International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets for state-contingent securities across the union, a …rst order condition analogous to (12) will hold for the representative household in any other country, say country f :
Combining (12) and (17), we obtain:
for all i; f 2 [0; 1] and all t, and where # i is a constant which will generally depend on initial conditions. Henceforth, and without loss of generality, we assume symmetric initial conditions (i.e., zero net foreign asset holdings for all countries, combined with an ex-ante identical environment), in which case we have
Taking logs on both sides of (18) and integrating over f we obtain
where c t R 1 0 c f t df is the (log) aggregate consumption index for the union as a whole.
Optimal Allocation of Government Purchases
Country i's public consumption index is given by
is the quantity of domestic good j purchased by the government. For simplicity, we assume that government purchases are fully allocated to domestically produced goods.
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For any given level of public consumption G i t (whose determination is a central focus of the analysis below), the government is assumed to allocate expenditures across goods in order to minimize total cost. This yields the following set of government demand schedules, analogous to those associated with private consumption:
In order to focus our attention on the determination of its aggregate level and its e¤ects (rather than the distortions induced by its …nancing), we assume that government spending is entirely …nanced by means of lump sum taxes (paid by domestic residents).
Firms 2.3.1 Technology
Each country has a continuum of …rms represented by the interval [0; 1]. Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good with a linear technology:
for all i; j 2 [0; 1], where A i t is a country-speci…c productivity shifter. The latter is assumed to follow an AR(1) process (in logs):
where a i t log A i t , a 2 [0; 1], and f" i t g is white noise. The assumption of a linear technology implies that the real marginal cost (expressed in terms of domestic goods) is common across …rms in any given country, and given (in logs) by mc
where i is a (constant) employment subsidy whose role is discussed below.
The amount of labor hired is thus given by
In the Appendix we show that equilibrium variations in z i t log Z i t around the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus, and up to a …rst order approximation, the following relationship between aggregate employment and output holds for all i 2 [0; 1]:
Price setting
Firms are assumed to set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983) . Hence, a measure 1 of (randomly selected) …rms sets new prices each period, with an individual …rm's probability of re-optimizing in any given period being independent of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. As is well known, the optimal pricesetting strategy for the typical …rm resetting its price in period t can be approximated by the (log-linear) rule:
where p i t denotes the (log) of newly set prices in country i (same for all …rms reoptimizing), and log 1 is the (log) of the optimal markup in the corresponding ‡exible price economy (or, equivalently, the markup prevailing in a zero in ‡ation steady state).
Equilibrium Dynamics

Aggregate Demand and Output Determination
The clearing of market for good j produced in country i requires
and where the last equality makes use of (18). An analogous condition must hold for all i; j 2 [0; 1] and all t.
Plugging the previous condition into the de…nition of country i's aggregate output
1 dj 1 we obtain the following aggregate goods market clearing condition for country i:
A log-linear approximation to that market clearing condition around a (symmetric) steady state is given by:
where a " b " symbol is used to denote log deviations of a variable from its steady state value, e.g., b
x t x t x, and where G Y denotes the steady state government spending share.
Using (19) and the terms of trade de…nition, we can rewrite (26) as follows:
The previous equation establishes that domestic output is positively related to government spending, union-wide consumption (which is an index for the strength of 10 The derivation makes use of a …rst order Taylor expansion of log(Y i t G i t ), as shown in the Appendix. We also use the fact that in a symmetric steady state S i = 1 (and hence
foreign demand), and inversely related to domestic prices (relative to average prices in the union).
Notice that we can integrate (27) over i 2 [0; 1] in order to obtain the union-wide goods market clearing condition:
where (14) over i 2 [0; 1] and combining the resulting di¤erence equation with (28), yields the following union-wide dynamic IS equation:
where t R 1 0 i t di. We can solve the previous equation forward and, under the assumption that lim T !1 E t fb g t+T g = lim T !1 E t fb y t+T g = 0 , write it in level form as:
Hence, we see that ‡uctuations in union-wide output will result from variations in union-wide government spending and expected long-term rates, with the weight attached to both factors being positively and negatively related, respectively, to the steady state share of government spending in output.
The Supply Side: Marginal Cost and In ‡ation Dynamics
Given our assumption of price setting à la Calvo, the dynamics of domestic in ‡ation in terms of real marginal cost in each individual country are described by the di¤erence equation
where c mc Using some of our previous results, we can further derive the following expression for marginal cost:
We can now combine (31) with (22) and (26) to obtain an expression for the marginal cost as a function of output and government spending, all expressed in deviations from steady state (and up to a …rst order approximation):
The intuition for the negative relationship between marginal cost and government spending is easy to grasp: given output, an increase in government spending crowds out domestic consumption and/or generates a real appreciation, both of which tend to reduce real marginal cost through their negative e¤ect on the product wage.
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In addition, we see that the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output is increasing in the government share . The reason is simple: in response to a given percent increase in output, and given an unchanged current level of current government spending b g i t and technology a i t , a larger is associated with a larger percent increase in consumption and/or the terms of trade. As a result, a larger increase in the product wage and, hence, marginal cost will obtain.
Combining (30) and (32) we can derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), applying to each economy in the union:
Notice also that by integrating the previous equation over i 2 [0; 1] we can obtain the corresponding new Keynesian Phillips curve for the union as a whole:
We have now derived the set of log-linear equilibrium conditions for in ‡ation and output in each individual country (summarized by (27) and (33)), as well as for the union as a whole (given by (29) and (34)), as a function of government spending (local and union-wide) and the common interest rate. Given the equilibrium path for those variables, one can use (14) (or, equivalently, (12) ) to back out the equilibrium consumption in each country.
Next we turn to the analysis of optimal policy design in the context of the above model. In the next section, and as a starting point of our analysis, we determine the e¢ cient allocation and its implementation under ‡exible prices.
The E¢ cient Allocation
In the present section we derive the e¢ cient allocation and show how it can be supported in equilibrium when prices are fully ‡exible. This will prove a useful benchmark for the analysis of optimal policy in the presence of nominal rigidities, to which we turn later.
The Social Planner' s Problem
The union's optimal allocation in any given period can be described as the solution to the following social planner's problem:
subject to the technological and resource constraints
for all i 2 [0; 1]. Notice that the previous constraints already embed the optimal condition whereby the di¤erent good types in any given country should be produced and consumed in identical quantities.
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Under our speci…cation of preferences, the optimality conditions for the social planner's problem are:
13 That condition in turn implies that
for all i 2 [0; 1]. In words, the marginal loss of utility for a household in country i of producing an additional unit of the composite good, given by (N i t ) ' =A i t , must be equal, at the margin, to the utility gain resulting from any of the three possible uses of that additional output: consumption by domestic households, consumption by all households in the union, and domestic government spending.
Using the resource constraint (35), and the fact that
we can guess and verify that the solution to the social planner's problem is given by:
for all i; f 2 [0; 1], and all t. Combining (38) and (39), together with de…nition of country i's total consumption index (2), we can derive an expression for the latter under the optimal allocation (in logs):
or, in levels,
where A t exp R 1 0 a f t df is an index of union-wide productivity. Aggregating over countries, we obtain the corresponding optimal allocation for the union as a whole:
Decentralization of the E¢ cient Allocation under Flexible Prices
Next we show how the union-wide optimal allocation derived above can be supported as an equilibrium in the presence of ‡exible prices. Letting variables with an upper bar denote their values in a ‡exible price equilibrium we have
In order for the equilibrium allocation under ‡exible prices to correspond to the union's socially optimal allocation the following conditions must be satis…ed for all i 2 [0; 1] and t. First, the subsidy i must be set at a level
Secondly, government spending must be set according to the rule
If both conditions are satis…ed for all i 2 [0; 1], the ‡exible price equilibrium will yield the level of employment and output in each country that is optimal from the union's perspective, i.e., Y 15 It is easy to check that the remaining optimality conditions will also be satis…ed as a result of households'optimization. Notice that in the economy with ‡exible prices, the lack of an autonomous monetary policy is of no consequence for the attainment of the optimal allocation, for 14 Or, equivalently,
In contrast with Galí and Monacelli (2005) , where the optimal allocation problem is analyzed from the viewpoint of a small open economy, here the choice of the subsidy is not a¤ected by any desire to in ‡uence the terms of trade in a country's favor. The reason is simple: that goal cannot be attained by all countries simultaneously, and hence it serves no purpose when trying to decentralize the solution to the union's social planner problem. As a result the only role played by the subsidy is to o¤set …rms'market power. monetary policy is neutral in that environment (it can only in ‡uence the path of prices). As a result, local …scal authorities can focus exclusively on the e¢ cient provision of public consumption goods, according to rule (43) (shadowing the central planner's decisions on that front). In our example economy that rule implies a constant government spending share G i t =Y i t = = for all t. While the level of prices in the union and in each individual country is determined by the monetary policy regime, each country's terms of trade as well as the in ‡ation di¤erentials vis a vis the union are fully determined by real factors in the present scenario. More speci…cally, note that the path for the terms of trade that will support the e¢ cient allocation is given by:
for all i 2 [0; 1], and all t. Given the de…nition of the terms of trade it follows that the in ‡ation di¤erential will be inversely proportional to the productivity growth di¤erential:
We have thus shown how under ‡exible prices the e¢ cient allocation can be supported in equilibrium through an appropriate choice of a subsidy (to eliminate market power distortion) and government spending policies (focused on providing the e¢ cient level of public goods). In that context, the policy pursued by the common central bank is of no relevance, since it can only in ‡uence aggregate in ‡ation, which under our assumptions generates no distortions. Not surprisingly, things are considerably di¤erent when nominal rigidities are present, the case to which we turn next.
Sticky Prices and Policy Tradeo¤s in the Currency Union
In the presence of nominal rigidities (and, in particular, of sticky prices) it is generally unfeasible for a monetary union to attain the e¢ cient allocation. The reasons are well understood. First, nominal rigidities imply that the level of employment and output within each country may di¤er from the e¢ cient one both in aggregate terms and, in the case of staggered price setting, in terms of its distribution across sectors (i.e., types of goods). This is true even if, assumed above, the distortion associated with market power is o¤set by means of a subsidy. Secondly, the sluggish adjustment of prices, combined with the impossibility of nominal exchange rate adjustments (inherent to a currency union), implies that the changes in terms of trade that are required to support the optimal allocation cannot occur instantaneously. As shown in Galí and Monacelli (2005) in the context of a related model, when each individual country has its own currency and an autonomous monetary policy (as opposed to the monetary union case considered here), stabilization of the domestic price level in each country guarantees that the ‡exible price equilibrium (and, hence, the optimal allocation) is attained. As we show next, this is no longer possible under a currency union, at least to the extent that di¤erent countries experience asymmetric shocks. As a result, several tradeo¤s arise, forcing policymakers to settle for a second best outcome. Next we discuss the nature of those tradeo¤s, looking in turn at those facing each of the union's members (and, hence, their …scal authorities) and, subsequently, those facing the union as a whole (and, hence, the common central bank).
Union Members'Tradeo¤s
Let y where we have imposed an optimal steady state government spending share ( = ). We can combine the previous expression with (30) to obtain a version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve for each union member, expressing domestic in ‡ation in terms of the corresponding output and …scal gaps:
In addition we can combine (27), (28) and (44), to obtain an equation determining the change in the output gap di¤erential as a function of the di¤erentials in …scal gap changes, in ‡ation and productivity growth:
The previous two equations describe the evolution of country i's output gap and price level as a function of the domestic …scal gap, given the productivity di¤erential and the union wide …scal and output gaps. They also make clear the nature of the tradeo¤ facing …scal authorities of union member countries. To illustrate those tradeo¤s, assume that e y t = e f t = p t = 0. Consider equation (45), describing the evolution of the price level in country i. That equation implies that by closing the output and …scal gaps at all times (and thus trying to replicate the ‡exible price equilibrium allocation), domestic prices would be fully stabilized. Yet, (46) makes clear that, in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks, closing the output gap (without creating a …scal gap) requires that the terms of trade and, hence, domestic prices, adjust.
Union-Wide Tradeo¤s
The evolution of in ‡ation, the output gap, and the …scal gap for the currency union is described by two aggregate equilibrium relations. Thus, by integrating (45), we can derive a version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve describing union-wide in ‡ation in terms of the output and …scal gaps:
The union's output gap is determined by a dynamic IS-type equation, which we can derive using (29):
= 1 e f t (r t E t f t+1 g rr t ) + E t fe y t+1 g 1 E t f e f t+1 g where rr t is the union's natural rate of interest, given by
Notice that, to the extent that the union's aggregate …scal gap e f t remains stable at zero, there is no tradeo¤ between stabilization of the output gap and in ‡ation for the union as a whole. In that case the outcome e y t = e t = 0 could be easily attained by having the central bank follow a rule of the sort
On the other hand, if the aggregated decisions of the local …scal authorities lead to ‡uctuations in the union-wide …scal gap, the job of the single central bank is considerably more di¢ cult. To illustrate this formally, notice that we can integrate (48) and combine it with (47) to yield:
Notice that a positive union-wide …scal gap, current and/or anticipated, will generate upward pressure on current in ‡ation. That pressure can only be partly o¤set by having the central bank run a tighter monetary policy, which would require raising current and/or future interest rates above their natural level, thus dampening the expansionary impact of members' …scal policies on the union's output gap and in ‡ation. Below we show that this is indeed the sort of rule that the union's central bank should adopt, as part of the optimal monetary-…scal policy mix for the union.
Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Currency Union
Next we derive and characterize the optimal …scal-monetary regime in the currency union. This regime involves full coordination of the monetary and …scal authorities, as if all policy decisions were centralized in a single policymaker, whose objective is to maximize the average welfare of union households. Note …rst that the policymakers'joint objective function corresponds to that of the social planner considered in section 3. Thus it should be clear that they will choose the same e¢ cient steady state, which is feasible and can be supported by means of the constant subsidy (42). Fluctuations about that steady state will in general be ine¢ cient, for the reasons discussed in the previous section. In the Appendix we show that a second order approximation to the average utility losses of union households resulting from ‡uctuations about the e¢ cient steady state takes the form:
where tips denotes terms that are independent of policy.
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We de…ne the optimal policy as the set of rules for the …scal gaps f e f i t g for all i 2 [0; 1] and the common interest rate fr t g, along with the associated second best outcomes f i t , e y i t g for all i 2 [0; 1], that maximize (49), subject to (45), (46), and the "aggregation" constraints
The optimal policy problem can be solved in two stages. First, we determine the processes f i t , e y i t , e f i t g, for all i 2 [0; 1]; that maximize (49) subject to (45), (46) and (50). Secondly, given the solution to that …rst-stage problem, we determine the interest rate rule that will support the implied paths for the union-wide in ‡ation, output gap and …scal gap, using (48).
The optimality conditions associated with the …rst-stage problem are given by:
for all i 2 [0; 1] and t = 0; 1; 2; :::, where f i ;t ; i y;t g, ;t , y;t , and f;t are the (discounted) Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints in (45), (46) and (50), and where (54), we obtain:
Similarly, integrating (52) over i 2 [0; 1], combining the resulting equation with (55), we obtain:
Both can be combined to yield
for t = 1; 2; 3; ::: whereas for t = 0 we have 0 + e y 0 = 0. Integrating (53) over i 2 [0; 1], combining the resulting equation with (56) and the result above, we obtain:
Notice that (58) and (59), together with the union-wide equilibrium conditions (47) and (48), imply that the equilibrium under the optimal policy will satisfy t = e y t = e f t = 0 (60) for all t. This is one of the central results emerging from our analysis. In words, we may state it as follows: the combined monetary-…scal policy mix must be such that, at the union level, in ‡ation, the output gap and the …scal gap remain at a constant (zero) value, at all times. That condition requires, in turn, that the equilibrium interest rate r t equals the union-wide natural rate rr t at all times. As argued above, and conditional on e f t = 0 for all t, the union's central bank can implement the desired outcome by adopting a policy rule of the form:
where > 1. What are the paths of in ‡ation and the output gap for each union member associated with the optimal policy? What …scal policy will support those paths?
Combining (52) and (53), and noticing that (55) and (56) imply 1 y;t + f;t = 0, we obtain:
(1 + ') e y
In this second best environment, as long as prices are less than fully ‡exible, we have i ;t > 0. Hence (61) immediately implies that, unlike the union-wide policy prescription (60), setting e f i t = e y i t = 0 for each member country i cannot be an equilibrium under the optimal policy.
To fully characterize the equilibrium dynamics, we notice that the aggregate multiplier ;t = R 1 0 i y;t di (from (54)) must evolve exogenously from the viewpoint of the single member country. By substituting (54), (55) and (56) into (51), (52) and (53), we de…ne a rational expectations equilibrium for country i as an allocation for n (45), (46), (51), (52), (53), for any given ;t and stochastic processes fa i t , a t g, along with the initial condition i ; 1 = 0. Next we illustrate the implied equilibrium dynamics and the optimal policy responses by means of some simulations.
Dynamic Simulations
In this section we illustrate the equilibrium behavior for a prototype member economy under the optimal policy arrangement described above. We resort to a series of dynamic simulations, and adopt the following benchmark calibration. We assume ' = 3, which implies a labor supply elasticity of , and a steady-state markup = 1:2, which implies that , the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods (of the same origin), is 6. Parameter is set to a benchmark value of 0:75 (a value consistent with an average period of one year between price adjustments), and report results for alternative values. We assume = 0:99, which implies a riskless annual return of about 4 percent in the steady state. As for the …scal sector, we parameterize the steady state share of government spending in output as = = 0:25, roughly the average share of government consumption in GDP for the euro zone.
We follow the real business cycle literature (King and Rebelo (1999) ) and assume the following autoregressive process for labor productivity in country i: Figure 1 displays impulse responses for a number of domestic variables to a one percent country-speci…c rise in productivity for alternative values of the price stickiness parameter . In particular, = 0 represents the limiting case of full (domestic) price ‡exibility.
Consider …rst the case of full price ‡exibility ( = 0). In that case there is no loss of e¢ ciency associated with in ‡ation, since the latter no longer creates any relative price distortions. Hence, as shown in the …gure, it is optimal to fully close the …scal gap and the output gap, in response to asymmetric movements in productivity.
18 As a result, it is optimal for the union member experiencing a productivity increase to fully absorb the latter through an adjustment in the terms of trade brought about by a change in the domestic price level, while maintaining output and government spending at their …rst-best levels.
To the extent that price stickiness is present ( > 0), there are welfare losses associated with departures from price stability, in addition to those stemming from nonzero output and …scal gaps. However -as discussed above-the ‡exible price/e¢ cient allocation is not feasible under the currency union regime. In particular, the rise in productivity must be absorbed only via a gradual and persistent fall in the price level, with the consequent relative price distortions. As a result, the optimal policy mix requires expanding the …scal gap to bring about the rise in demand necessary to accommodate the desired expansion in output, thus smoothing the adjustment of prices over time. To see that formally, notice that in the equilibrium under the optimal policy equation (46) simpli…es to:
18 In fact, under price ‡exibility, equation (45) does not act as a constraint on the evolution of domestic prices. Hence, optimal policy in this case must satisfy equation (61) a t (and where, without loss of generality, we have normalized p t = 0). Hence, to the extent that the price level reacts gradually, the rise in productivity will be absorbed via a combination of a fall in the output gap and a rise in the …scal gap. In general, the local …scal authority is required to trade-o¤ movements in in ‡ation on the one hand with movements in the output and …scal gap on the other. The higher the degree of price rigidity, the larger the implied ‡uctuations of both gaps under the optimal policy. 19 Notice that, under our benchmark calibration, welfare losses from any given output gap variation are of an order of magnitude larger than the ones implied by the same variation in the …scal gap. This explains why in Figure 1 the implied volatility of the …scal gap is larger than the one in the output gap. The optimal balance between the two variables will in general depend on the relative weights attached to the quadratic terms in e y i t and e f i t in the welfare loss function (49). These weights depend in turn on parameters ' and . The lower the elasticity of labor supply (i.e., the larger ') the smaller the adjustment in the output gap (relative to the …scal gap), whereas the larger (the share of government spending in the optimal steady state) the lower the adjustment brought about via the …scal gap (relative to the output gap).
Conclusions
We have developed a tractable multicountry framework suitable for monetary and …scal policy analysis in a currency union. As an application, we have determined the optimal monetary-…scal policy mix in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to productivity. Given our assumed nominal rigidities, the presence of those shocks, combined with the impossibility of resorting to nominal exchange rate adjustments, induces an ine¢ cient response of the terms of trade that justi…es the use of …scal policy as a stabilization tool. In particular, the union-wide optimal policy calls for variations in local government spending that go beyond the mere e¢ cient provision of public goods. On the other hand, the union's central bank should seek to stabilize the price level in the union as a whole.
Our framework is amenable to extensions along several dimensions. In order to meet our self-imposed tractability requirement, we have restricted ourselves to less-than-general parametric speci…cations for utility and technology. The work of Forlati (2007) addresses some of the challenges arising from the relaxation of those assumptions. Our model ignores other aspects that are likely to be relevant for the design of optimal policies. Missing elements include, among others, the presence of sticky wages (along with sticky prices), the need to rely on distortionary taxes, the e¤ects of government debt policies, and the likely existence of non-fully Ricardian behavior on the part of households. Finally, our framework assumes the presence of complete international …nancial markets. By relaxing the assumption of perfect risk-sharing, one could presumably generate a complementary role for …scal policy as a cross-country insurance tool. The emergence of a potential con ‡ict between the latter and the stabilization role described in the present paper is likely to constitute an interesting avenue worth exploring in future research. We plan to pursue some of those extensions in future work.
A Union' s Welfare Loss
For notational simplicity we omit country subscripts, unless needed. 
Let e y t = y t y t and e g t = g t g t denote the output and …scal gaps, respectively, as de…ned in the text. Note that= b y t = e y t + (y t y) and b g t = e g t + (g t g): Hence, b g t b y t = e g t e y t + (g t y t ) log . Quite generally, g t and y t will depend on exogenous shocks only. In the present model, g t y t = log . Thus, when considering ‡uctuations about the e¢ cient steady state (with = ) we have b g t b y t = e g t e y t , allowing to write:
log(Y t G t ) ' 1 1 (e y t e g t ) 1 2 (1 ) 2 (e g t e y t ) 2 + tips 
1+'
A second order Taylor expansion of the disutility of labor about a steady state is given by
where b n t log Nt N . In the model in the text, the steady state about which the economy ‡uctuates under the optimal policy is given by N = 1. Hence, we have dj, and where we use the fact that y t = a t :
The following lemma shows that z t is proportional to the cross-sectional distribution of relative prices (and, hence, of second order).
Lemma 1: z t ' 2 var j fp t (j)g Proof: see Appendix 2.
Using the previous results we can thus rewrite the second order approximation to the disutility of labor about that steady state in terms of the output gap and the price dispersion terms as:
' e y t + z t + 1 2 (1 + ') e y 2 t + tips
Collecting results and reintroducing country subscripts, we can write the second order approximation to aggregate welfare in the monetary union as follows: In order to express utility in terms of in ‡ation we make use of the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: In addition, a second order approximation to Pt(j) Pt
, yields:
Combining the two previous results, it follows that Z 1 0 P t (j) P t di = 1 + 2 E j fb p t (j) 2 g = 1 + 2 var j fp t (j)g from which it follows that z t ' 2 var j fp t (j)g
Lemma 2: P 1 t=0 t z t = 
